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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates venture capitalists’ monitoring of managerial behaviour by 
examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling 
structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring 
depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) 
monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems 
caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is 
more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, 
and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems 
have a greater impact on VC monitoring than managerial agency problems. Overall, our 
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study suggests that venture capitalists' monitoring role is hampered in an emerging market 
where firms have complex ownership structures that contribute to severe agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders. 
 
Key words: Venture capital; disproportionate ownership; the pay-performance relationship; 
agency problems.  
JEL Classification: G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional wisdom indicates that venture capital (VC) investors, who typically 
make a profit by funding, monitoring, and then exiting entrepreneurial companies, tend to be 
specialists in developing and monitoring new ventures. Engel et al. (2002) find that venture 
capitalists directly monitor managerial behaviour, documenting that firms with greater VC 
involvement display a weaker pay-performance association than comparable companies. 
Strong VC oversight substitutes for the pay-performance relationship, since managers are 
directly monitored by venture capitalists. In comparison, entrepreneurial firms without VCs 
may have to rely on various performance measures in annual compensation grants to 
incentivize CEOs. Barry et al. (1990) also find that venture capitalists play a key role in 
monitoring top management in entrepreneurial firms that are characterized by high-risk and 
high-growth opportunities, indicating that more direct monitoring is required when the classic 
managerial conflict described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is more severe.   
However, the existing literature of VC monitoring and its impact on the CEO pay-
performance relationship (Engel et al., 2002) is only based on US firms where shares are 
usually diversely held by shareholders. There is no evidence to suggest whether VC 
monitoring will still be effective in emerging markets, where firms have more concentrated 
ownership structures. Previous studies show that in the corporate world outside the US and 
UK, ownership is usually concentrated in the hands of a few controlling shareholders through 
complex ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). For example, in 
most emerging economies, where legal protection for shareholders can be weak, large 
controlling shareholders usually control listed firms through disproportionate ownership 
structures (Faccio et al., 2001; 2010; Lin et al., 2011, 2012). In previous literature, such 
disproportionate ownership structure are associated with severe agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders because controlling shareholders of those firms usually 
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have an incentive to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders (Lemmon and Lins, 
2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2004; Gompers et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2011, 2012). It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that effective VC monitoring may be hampered because controlling 
shareholders in these firms have strong incentives and the ability to transfer corporate 
resources for private benefits at the expense of other investors, including venture capitalists 
(Lin et al., 2011).  
In this paper we investigate venture capitalists' monitoring role in an emerging market 
by examining their impact on the CEO pay-performance relationship and how the strength of 
their monitoring is influenced by agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders. In particular we examine: (1) whether venture capitalists' direct monitoring 
reduce entrepreneurial firms' reliance on performance-based contracts; (2) whether  venture 
capitalists' monitoring role differs in firms with different levels of agency conflict between 
controlling-minority shareholders; (3) whether VC plays a monitoring role in firms with 
greater managerial agency problems, which have greater need for monitoring; (4) whether 
controlling-minority agency problems have greater impact on  venture capitalists' monitoring 
than managerial agency problems; and (5) whether non-state-funded and state-funded VC 
have a similar incentive to monitor. 
We conduct our research using a sample of Chinese entrepreneurial firms due to their 
specific controlling structures. More specifically, Chinese entrepreneurial firms have a 
controlling structure characterized by the ubiquitous presence of the disproportionate 
ownership structures. As indicated by Fan et al. (2011), disproportionate ownership structure 
is an important institutional factor that influences firms’ corporate finance and managerial 
behaviour in an emerging market, such as the Chinese capital market. Previous studies have 
shown that with disproportionate ownership structures, the controlling shareholders always 
have a strong incentive to expropriate the interests of other investors, including venture 
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capitalists, because they obtain all the private benefit without bearing the full consequences 
(Lin et al., 2012). This means that a disproportionate ownership structure results in severe 
agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002; Faccio et al., 2010; Wei and Zhang, 2008; Lin et al., 2011; Liu and 
Tian, 2012). It is therefore interesting to examine whether VC monitoring is strengthened or 
weakened by the severe controlling-minority shareholders agency conflicts caused by 
disproportionate ownership structures. We exclude state-owned enterprise (SOEs) for the 
following two reasons. First, the assumption underlying our analysis is that firms tend to 
adopt performance-based compensation to incentivize managers. However, CEOs in SOEs 
are usually paid based on their official ranking rather than their performance given that 
managers are nominated by the government to pursue the government's objectives rather than 
maximizing value (Fan et al., 2007). Therefore a weaker pay-performance relationship does 
not necessarily reflect the stronger role of VC monitoring
2
. Second, compared to these 
entrepreneurial controlled firms, SOEs in China have different principal–agent framework: 
the dominating agency issue in SOEs is the agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers rather than between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders even 
although they also adopt disproportionate ownership structure (Rousseau and Xiao, 2007). 
            Since China has become the second largest economy in terms of VC-related activities 
such as initial public offerings (IPOs), fund raising, and entrepreneurial financing (Ahlstrom 
et al., 2007), it therefore provides a perfect context to examine the role venture capitalists 
play in entrepreneurial firms. Using Heckman two-step regressions that address potential 
endogeneity issues throughout the paper, our empirical findings confirm the monitoring role 
of venture capitalist weakens the relationship between CEO compensation and market 
performance of Chinese entrepreneurial firms (ECEs). In order to find out whether venture 
                                                          
2 We appreciate the reviewers’ comment and suggestion on this issue. 
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capitalists' monitoring role is influenced by agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders, we examine the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in ECEs with 
and without disproportionate ownership structure. As expected, we find that the monitoring 
role of VC weakens or disappears in ECEs with disproportionate ownership structures 
although the actual ownership of VC in these firms is higher than firms without 
disproportionate ownership. By examining the effect that significant VC and actual VC 
ownership have on pay-performance relationship, we provide direct evidence that the 
difference in the effect that VC has on pay-performance relationship in ECEs with and 
without disproportionate ownership structure reflects the difference in agency conflicts rather 
than the difference in actual VC ownership. We further examine the effect that VCs have on 
the pay-performance relationship of firms with different levels of managerial agency 
problems to see whether the level of VC monitoring differs when firms have different 
monitoring needs. From this examination we find that VCs weaken the pay-performance 
relationship more in firms that need greater managerial discretion.  
As robustness test, we also examine the effect of VC on pay-performance sensitivity, 
measured by delta of CEO compensation, which identify whether the change in executive 
compensation is due to the change in performance and VC monitoring. Our results reveal that 
the negative effect of VC on delta of CEO compensation is weakened in firms with severe 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Our results confirm that 
controlling-minority shareholder agency conflict dominates venture capitalists' monitoring 
other than managerial agency problems. We further provide evidence that VCs tend to invest 
in those firms with lower costs and shorter investment duration to IPO. This result addresses 
the concern that why venture capitalists invest in firms with severe controlling-minority 
agency problems where their interests are more likely to be exploited. We also provide 
evidence that non-state funded VCs have stronger incentive to monitoring than state funded 
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VCs. Finally, our results are found to be robust when we use either an alternative model that 
controls for expected pay and expected performance or industry-adjusted measures of 
performance. 
The major contribution of this paper is that we investigate what Engel et al. (2002)  
ignore: the potential conflict between controlling shareholders and venture capitalists. By 
examining the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in firms with different 
controlling structures, we find that direct monitoring by venture capitalists is hampered by the 
disproportionate ownership structure. Second, our study also contributes to agency theory in 
that extant literature examines the values of firms’ ownership structure by focusing on either 
the managerial agency conflict in US firms (Berger et al., 1997), or the controlling-minority 
shareholders conflict in firms with concentrated ownership structures (Claessens et al., 2000, 
2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Faccio et al., 2001, 2010). We have now extended the existing 
literature by providing evidence that in countries where firms are controlled by large 
controlling shareholders, the strength of VC monitoring is influenced by both agency 
problems, but in opposite directions. Moreover, the dominating controlling-minority agency 
conflict in emerging markets has greater impact on VC monitoring than the managerial 
agency conflict. Third, VC monitoring has been widely documented by previous studies in 
developed countries such as the US, but in emerging markets such as China it is still a black 
box, even though the VC industry has grown rapidly over the last few years. This study fills 
this gap by showing that VC monitoring is greatly reduced by the agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders caused by disproportionate ownership structure in 
China. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the pertinent 
literature and develops our main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the variable measures and 
8 
 
chosen methodology. Section 4 outlines and interprets our primary empirical results, and 
Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions. 
 
2. Institutional background, literature review, and development of the hypothesis  
2.1 VC within China’s institutional context 
The Chinese capital market is characterized as being greatly influenced by 
government intervention, as is the development of VC. In the 1980s and 1990s, China began 
to establish a few state-funded VC firms to promote the development of high-technology 
industries (Xiao, 2002). Since 1999 the Chinese VC industry has gained more support from 
the government, including the establishment in 2004 of a Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME) board
3
 within the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, a NASDAQ-type market where 
entrepreneurial firms make initial public offerings (IPOs) in China, and the implementation in 
2006 of “the Interim Measures for the Administration of Early-Stage Venture Capital 
Enterprises.” Since then, VC activities have increased rapidly, and according to recent 
statistical data from the China Venture Capital Research Institute’s 2008 Report, there were 
402 (261 domestic and 141 foreign) VC firms active in China by that year. The total amount 
of capital committed to VC reached US$ 36.67 billion in 2008, and the average amount of 
VC capital per institution was US$ 191.96 million.  
VC investment in China depends on its unique institutional environment, which 
differs significantly from its US counterpart. Because China’s legal system offers little 
protection for either minority or private investors (Peng, 2001), venture capitalists must 
reduce their investment risks by selecting companies or industries with a record of 
profitability, or located in Beijing or Shanghai. For example, in the US during the 1961–1992 
period, high-tech industries such as communications and computer-related industries received 
                                                          
3 The SME board aims to encourage early-stage firms with smaller size and higher growth opportunity to go public; thus this 
market provides an ideal channel for VC investors to exit. 
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the most VC investment (Gompers, 1995), but in China, traditional industry has received the 
greatest proportion (29.4%) of total VC investment, with around 50% of VC firms and VC 
backed firms being located in Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen (China Venture Capital 
Research Institute’s report, 2008).   
 The most profitable strategy for exiting an entrepreneurial firm is through an initial 
public offering (IPO). According to Gompers and Lerner (1999), every $1 invested in a firm 
that later has an IPO generates a profit of $1.95, whereas every $1 invested in a firm that is 
acquired only generates a profit of $0.40. In the US the NASDAQ makes it easy for VC firms 
to exit through IPOs, while in China, despite the establishment of the Growth Enterprises 
Market (GEM) in 2009, it remains difficult for small and medium entrepreneurial firms to go 
public
4
. The lock-up period in China is longer than in the US. For example, in the US, VC 
shares in an IPO are often subject to a lock-up period of 180 days on average, after which 
they can liquidate or distribute their shares to limited partners with few further restrictions 
(Dauterive and Fok, 2004). In China, however, before the share split reform from 2005 to 
2007, VC shares in an IPO were regarded as “legal person shares” that could not be traded on 
the stock exchange. Since the share split reform in 2007, VC shares can be traded on the 
capital market, but the lock-up period often lasts three years.
5
 Therefore, VCs in China would 
have strong incentives to monitor their sponsored IPO companies. Overall, under China’s 
unique institutional background, the rapid growth over the past 10 years of both VC investors 
and VC-backed firms provides a unique opportunity to understand their monitoring role.    
 
                                                          
4 That is because the Chinese securities regulatory commission (CSRC) requires that firms who want to list with the SME 
board must meet  a number of financial requirements: 1) the firm has had a consistently positive net profit over the past three 
years and a total net profit over the past three years  of no less than 30 million; 2) the total operation cash flow over the past 
three years is no less than 50 million or the total sales revenue over the past three years is no less than 300 million; 3) the 
total shares outstanding before IPO is no less than 30 million; and 4) total intangible assets are less than 20% of total net 
assets.  
5 In fact, because of the share-split problem and the long lock-up period in China, although our sample includes a number of 
VC-backed firms listed on the Chinese capital market, no  venture capitalists really exited from VC-backed firms during our 
research period, which is also why we do not control for VC exit in our regression models. 
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2.2 Literature review  
2.2.1 Venture capitalists' monitoring of management 
A few studies focus explicitly on how venture capitalists affect the board of directors 
in entrepreneurial firms. Hochberg (2008) finds that venture capitalists have strong incentives 
to monitor the managerial behaviour of the firms in which they invest, while Gompers (1995), 
in a similar argument, uses a random 1961–1992 sample to show that VC firms monitor 
entrepreneurs more frequently when agency costs are expected to be high, and Lerner (1995) 
used a 1978–1989 sample of American bio-technology firms to show that VC firms are 
important managerial monitors. In privately held entrepreneurial firms, Hellmann and Puri 
(2002) show that VCs play an important role, especially during CEO turnovers.  
Engel et al. (2002), using 1996–1999 sample of US listed firms, find that the pay-
performance relationship is stronger in non-VC-backed firms than VC-backed, suggesting 
that direct VC monitoring should have a substitutionary effect on CEO pay-performance. One 
implication of Engle et al. (2002) is that venture capitalists' direct monitoring should be 
stronger, while firms incentivize executives by relying less on monetary compensation when 
firms need more managerial discretion. How venture capitalists affect firms’ compensation 
policies for CEOs in the presence of controlling shareholders remains an open question. Such 
a compensation policy is especially important because CEOs are often hired by controlling 
shareholders and their incentives are not aligned with VCs or other minority shareholders. In 
this case, venture capitalists' monitoring managerial behaviour can be weakened due to the 
existence of the powerful controlling shareholders. We therefore empirically examine 
whether the findings of Engel et al. (2002) can be generalized into a weak institutional 
environment characterized by concentrated ownership structures. 
 
2.2.2 Controlling structure and the pay-performance relationship 
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According to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), making executive 
compensation dependent on firm performance is an important measure for reducing 
managerial agency conflict. Not only is this positive pay-performance relationship confirmed 
in several earlier empirical studies for the US (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992) but more recently, another important body of literature has indicated that the 
pay-performance relationship is also influenced by specific types of ownership structure. For 
example, in the Chinese setting the pay-performance relationship is impaired by state-
ownership (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006), while in European countries family 
ownership seems to have a positive impact on executive compensation (Elston and Goldberg, 
2003; Barontini and Bozzi, 2010).  
Overall, the previous research indicates that a firm’s ownership structure has a 
considerable impact on the CEO pay-performance relationship even though no evidence 
exists to prove whether the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship differs between 
firms with different controlling structures and associated agency problems.  
 
2.3 Development of the hypotheses  
2.3.1 VC monitoring and firms’ controlling structures 
            According to Engel et al. (2002), direct VC monitoring reduces the need for costly 
performance-based incentives in compensation because the VC firms’ closer involvement and 
expertise enable them to base CEO compensation on information about managerial actions 
that is not reflected in measures of current performance. Therefore, VC and firm performance 
should have a strong substitutionary effect on the CEO compensation of US firms, which 
usually have dispersed ownership structures. However, the monitoring role of VC is found in 
the US firms that are dominated by the managerial agency problem, where VC plays a 
monitoring role in alleviating this problem. This study expects that the monitoring role of VC 
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may be hampered in an emerging market where firms are controlled by controlling 
shareholders and the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders 
dominates. Particularly, the monitoring role of VC is expected to be weakened by the agency 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders caused by the disproportionate 
ownership structure in ECEs. Particularly, we expect that the substitutionary effect of VC on 
the pay-performance relationship would be stronger in ECEs without a disproportionate 
ownership structure than those with a disproportionate structure because it is associated with 
less severe agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders (Claessens, 2000; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). According to Faccio et al. (2001, 2011), expropriation by the 
controlling shareholder is very strong in emerging markets where the legal system is still 
weak, and hence the controlling shareholders of Chinese firms with a disproportionate 
ownership structure usually have a strong incentive to expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders, including VC investors. As a result, we expect that these large controlling 
shareholders will be reluctant to be monitored by VC investors, because this direct 
monitoring will curb their expropriation. That is, as the following hypothesis implies, VC 
monitoring will be weakened when the controlling shareholders have excess control rights: 
H1: VC monitoring only exists in ECEs without disproportionate ownership; that is, the 
presence of VC weakens the pay-performance relationship in ECEs without disproportionate 
ownership more than in those with disproportionate ownership.           
 
2.3.2 VC monitoring and the managerial agency conflict 
As previously analyzed, if the aim of VC monitoring is to reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers stemming from agency problems between managers and shareholders, 
it is reasonable to expect that venture capitalists usually monitor firms with a greater need for 
very close monitoring; that is, firms with higher managerial agency costs and discretions. In 
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terms of agency cost, Gompers (1995) suggests that firms with higher growth opportunities 
and more capital expenditure tend to have more managerial discretion, and are thus more 
likely to require closer monitoring by VC investors. Therefore, we further expect that firms 
with higher growth opportunities or capital expenditure have more need of VC monitoring 
due to higher managerial agency problems. From this we establish the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: VC monitoring only exists in firms with more need of monitoring; that is, the presence of 
VC weakens the pay-performance relationship in firms with more severe managerial agency 
problems. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
Our sample includes all VC-backed and non-VC-backed newly listed firms from 2004 
to 2009 that are listed with the Chinese SME board. This sample period has been chosen 
because most VC-backed IPOs began to be listed after 2004. Firms from the SME board have 
been chosen because the board was created to allow small or medium-sized and growth firms, 
which are firms that are more likely to be backed by VC, to tap into the equity market. While 
some VC-backed firms have recently chosen to be listed on the GEM board of the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, this market is excluded from our sample mainly because the GEM board 
was established in late 2009
6
.  
CEO pay, performance and other financial and governance information used are 
collected from a series of data sets developed by the SinoFin Information Services of the 
China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) at Beijing University. They include the 
Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database (2004–2009) and the Chinese Listed Firm 
                                                          
6 Our research needs at least two years of observations because our regressions use lagged values of performance or CEO 
compensation. 
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Corporate Governance Database (2004–2009). The VC data and related information are 
collected by compiling shareholder information from the company prospectuses for their 
IPOs. As indicated in earlier studies, the CCER is one of the most important data sets on the 
Chinese capital market.   
As with previous research, we exclude financial firms, Special Treatment (ST) firms, 
and firms whose relevant data were either incomplete or inaccessible.
7
  Our sample consists 
of 1,057 firm-year observations of 357 newly listed firms during 2004–2009. However, 
because CEO pay responds to firm performance in the previous year, we also conform to the 
usual research practice of using lagged performance values when studying the CEO pay-
performance relationship (Firth et al., 2007), and conduct our regressions from the second 
year after the firm’s IPO year. As the reasons given before, SOEs with 178 observations are 
further excluded. Our final sample for regression therefore covers 2005 to 2009 and 
comprises 522 firm-year observations for 203 newly listed ECEs.  
 
3.2 Variable measurements 
3.2.1 CEO compensation (LNPAY) 
Since 1998, listed firms in China have been required to disclose their managerial 
compensation in an annual report, including the salary and bonus aggregation of the top three 
executives. We therefore use the log of the total compensation of the top three executives, 
designated as the variable LNPAY, as a proxy for CEO compensation
8
.  
3.2.2 Firm performance 
                                                          
7 Financial firms and ST firms (in other words, firms in financial distress), of which there is only one each in our sample, are 
excluded because they have quite specific financial characteristics. 
8 This paper does not include stock options as part of CEO compensation for the following reasons: (1) Only about 5% of the 
total sample firms announced stock options, which is not enough for conducting a regression analysis; (2) there is no option 
market in China, so it is difficult to estimate the value of stock options; and (3) there is no regulation requirement for the 
information release of stock options, so the announcement of limited stock options does not include adequate information for 
using the models to estimate the value of stock options. 
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Following Firth et al. (2006), Cheng (2008), and Cao et al. (2011), we measure the 
firms’ accounting-based performance using return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). 
We proxy the firms’ market performance using Tobin’s Q and share return (SR).  The former 
is measured as the ratio of market value to firm replacement value together with each firm’s 
annual share return, while the latter is the yearly share return of each firm in each year. We 
also calculate industry-adjusted performance in terms of the differences between a firm’s 
actual ROA/ROS/Q/SR and the median ROA/ROS/Q/SR in the same industry in the same 
year (expressed as ROAAD, ROSAD, QAD, and SRAD), and use these measures to boost 
our main results. 
3.2.3 Measures of VC 
Our regressions also include several variables that measure firms’ VC ownership as 
another type of main independent variable. Following Hochberg (2008), we first define the 
dummy variable VC as equal to 1 if a firm received VC investment before an IPO and 0 
otherwise. Second, following Engel et al. (2002), who define a "significant VC" as 1 if VC 
ownership is more than 20% to measure the potential VC monitoring, we also create a similar 
variable, SIGVC to examine whether higher VC ownership will result in stronger VC 
monitoring
9
. With regard to the VC characteristics, we create two variables: VCCOST, or the 
investment P/BV ratio when VC made the investment; and VCDURARTION, the number of 
years between the initial VC investment year and the IPO year. STATEVC and 
NONSTATEVC dummies are also defined according to whether the VC company is state 
funded or not. Finally we also define the variable ‘VCOWNERSHIP’ that is defined as the 
percentage of shareholdings of VC investors to measure the actual ownership of VCs. 
3.2.4 Categorical variable 
                                                          
9 We did not use significant VC as our main regression variable because VC ownership in China is usually lower than that in 
the US, which means that more than half of VC-backed firms have a VC ownership of less than 20%. If we use this variable 
as main measure of VC, we may ignore the VC monitoring in firms that have VC ownership of less than 20%.  
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We separate our sample of Chinese ECEs according to firms’ controlling structures10 
by defining a company as ‘DIS’ if the control rights of the controlling shareholder exceed its 
cash flow rights or as a firm without DIS if they do not (based on Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Faccio et al., 2010).  
 
3.2.4 Control variables 
Firm size (SIZE) 
Most of the previous studies report a strong positive relationship between firm size 
and CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999; Brunello et al., 2001; Elston and Goldberg, 2003; 
Firth et al., 2006), and conclude that CEOs are paid more when a company is more successful 
and when a company is larger. Like these studies, we measure firm size (SIZE) as the log of 
its total assets. 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) 
Corporate governance theory states that the board of directors generally exists to 
advise and monitor top management, establish executive compensation, and protect the 
interests of its shareholders.  Previous studies have indicated that the effectiveness of a board 
is influenced by its size. For example, Yermack (1996) shows that small boards are more 
effective than large boards because the latter have less influence over CEOs, which 
complicates decision-making. We therefore use board size (BOARDSIZE) as a control 
variable.  
Board composition (BOARDCOMP) 
The effectiveness of a board of directors is also influenced by the proportion of 
independent directors, because a larger number of independent directors can protect 
shareholders’ interests and monitor managerial behaviour far more effectively (Cheng, 2008). 
                                                          
10 We also use other classification criteria, which will be indicated as used. 
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We therefore use board composition (BOARDCOMP) as another control variable to measure 
the independence of a board of directors.   
Leverage (LEV) 
Leverage, always an important external power for monitoring managers, has been 
shown in previous research to influence both CEO compensation and firm performance. 
Hence, we also include leverage (LEV) as a control variable, measured as the book value of 
total debts to total assets.  
CEO duality (DUALITY) 
Previous research also shows that when the CEO is the chairman of the board, the 
ability of the board to monitor management is weak and the agency cost between managers 
and shareholders increases (Core et al., 1999). Therefore, empirical studies of CEO 
compensation usually indicate a positive relationship between CEO compensation and the 
CEO/chairman duality. To address this issue, we include duality (DUALITY) as a control 
variable.  
CEO age (CEOAGE) 
Age is seen as an important individual characteristic for managers, not only because 
older managers usually have more industrial experience (which is very valuable to the firm), 
but also because the literature indicates that age is significantly positively related with CEO 
compensation (Brunello et al., 2001). Hence, we define the variable CEO age (CEOAGE) as 
a measure of CEO experience. 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 
Previous research on the CEO pay-performance relationship in China also shows that 
firms with foreign investors have stronger pay-performance sensitivities, which implies that 
foreign investors have more incentive to monitor managers and encourage firms to pay 
managers according to their performance (Firth et al., 2006). Therefore, to measure the effect 
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of foreign ownership, we create a dummy variable for foreign ownership (FOREIGN), which 
equals 1 if a firm has one or more foreign shareholders, and 0 otherwise.   
CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) 
According to the literature, CEO ownership may also be an important determinant of 
compensation; for example, Core et al. (1999) indicate that CEO compensation decreases 
when CEO ownership increases. We therefore include CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) in our 
regressions. 
Other control variables  
We include a year and an industry dummy in our equation to control the effect of time 
and industry. In China, however, because of the Chinese official industry classifications, 
some industries only include a limited number of firms. We therefore follow Firth et al. (2006) 
and classify our sample into five groups: industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and 
conglomerate (all other industries). Table 1 gives detailed definitions for all the variables 
used in this paper.  
<Table 1> 
3.3 Estimation models 
 To address any potential endogeneity issue of VC, this study adopts the Heckman 
two-step regression method with instrument variables throughout the paper. In the first step 
of the regressions, we analyze the probability of VC backing using a probit regression model 
where the explanatory variables include instrumental variables as well as other controls, and 
get the predicted value of VC. In the second stage we conduct new regressions by including 
the predicted VC from the first-stage regression in the baseline regression models.  
The key for the success of the two-step regression model is the choice of instrument 
variables, which must be exogenously determined. This study chooses firm location 
(LOCATION) and listing time (LISTTIME) as instrumental variables, following Baker and 
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Gompers (1999). In terms of the location, just as the VC industry in the US is concentrated in 
several states, including Massachusetts, California, and Texas,  in China, between 1991 and 
2001, more than 70% of VC-backed firms were located in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, or Shandong (Zeng, 2004). The probability of VC backing is therefore 
related to the location of a firm. With regard to the second variable, previous literature on 
VCs in the US also indicates that whether a firm was founded after 1979 has an important 
impact on the probability of VC backing (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Kortum and Lener, 
1999; Baker and Gompers, 1999). Because the rapid expansion of the VC industry in China 
began after March 2006, the implementation of “The Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Early-Stage Venture Capital Enterprises”, which dramatically increased the 
probability of VC backing in the Chinese capital market, we identify whether a firm was 
listed before or after March 1, 2006. 
We establish the following baseline equation, following Engel et al. (2002):          
εXβEPERFORMANC*VC/SIGVCβ
EPERFORMANCβVCβαLNPAY
ti,41-ti,3
1-t,i,2ti,
^
1ti,


                                                          Equation (1) 
 
 where i and t represent the firm and year, respectively, and ε is the error term related to 
unobservable features that explain the cross sectional variation in CEO pay. VC^ is the 
predicted value of VC from the first step regression. PERFORMANCE is firm performance, 
measured by return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), Tobin’s Q (Q), and share return 
(SR), which are regressed in separate equations. X is a vector of control variables as specified 
in Table 1. We also include year and industry dummy variables to control the fixed effects for 
industry and year, and cluster standard errors at firm level, as VC does not vary over time for 
a given firm.  
3.4 Summary statistics and univariate tests 
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3.4.1 Distribution of VC and summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our sample, of which panels A and B show 
the distribution of VC-backed firms and firm-year observations respectively; Panels C and D 
present the distribution of VC ownership (VCOWNERSHIP) and state funded VC 
(STATEVC); and panel E presents the descriptive statistics of variables based on firm-year 
observations.  
The results in panels A and B indicate that VC-backed firms (VC dummy) account for 
about 26.60% (25.48%) of our total of 203 (522) firms (firm-year observations). In addition, 
the percentage of VC-backed firms and VC-backed observations does not vary greatly 
between ECEs with disproportionate ownership and those without. Our result suggests that 
VCs do not have preference in choosing firms without severe agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders, so venture capitalist’s monitoring role in firms with 
different controlling-minority agency conflicts are less likely to be caused by VC’s 
investment preference.  
In addition, panel C shows that the average VC ownership in VC-backed ECEs, VC-
backed ECEs with disproportionate ownership, and VC-backed ECEs without 
disproportionate ownership is 13.36 per cent, 15.69 per cent, and 10.56 per cent respectively, 
indicating that VCs actually have more investment in firms with disproportionate ownership 
structure, that is, the actual ownership of VCs is higher in firms with disproportionate 
ownership structure than firms without. This finding enables us to identify whether the 
difference in the effect of VC on pay-performance relationship is caused by the difference in 
the actual ownership of VC or agency conflict between the controlling and minority 
shareholders. If the former works, we should observe a stronger monitoring of VC in firms 
with disproportionate ownership structure, given the higher VC ownership in these firms, but 
if as expected, our empirical results indicates a stronger VC monitoring in ECEs without 
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disproportionate ownership structure, we can conclude that the difference in the effect of VC 
on pay-performance relationship is driven by the difference in agency conflicts in ECEs with 
and without disproportionate ownership structure because those VCs have stronger 
monitoring in ECEs without disproportionate ownership even though their actual ownership 
is lower.  Finally, we find from panel D that 7.14 percent of our full observations, consist of 
both SOEs and ECEs are backed by state-funded VCs, which is close to the number in ECEs 
sample (7.09 percent). The result indicates that state-funded VCs do not have preference in 
investing in SOEs. 
Regarding the descriptive statistics of our variables, we find from panel E that the 
average CEO compensation for the top three executives is 896,660 RMB, and that the 
average ROA, ROS, Q, and SR for the sample firms is 6%, 10%, 1.66, and 72%, respectively.  
<Table 2> 
3.4.2 Univariate test results 
Table 3 presents the univariate test results of CEO pay for VC-backed and non-VC-
backed observations in different groups of firms.  
If VC plays a monitoring role in the Chinese market, we should observe that VC-
backed firms have higher performance but lower CEO compensation than non-VC-backed 
firms. However, we find from panel A that VC-backed firms have both significantly higher 
CEO compensation and significantly higher ROA, ROS, and Q than non-VC-backed firms, 
although the result does not clearly suggest whether  venture capitalists have a monitoring 
role or not . 
According to panel B, higher ROA, ROS and Q in Non-VC-backed ECEs without 
disproportionate ownership structure are associated with significantly higher CEO 
compensation, suggesting a significantly positive pay-performance relationship in these firms. 
But the significant positive relationship between ROS and Q disappear in VC-backed ECEs 
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without disproportionate ownership structure. The results suggest that the positive CEO pay-
performance relationship is weakened by the presence of VC in ECEs that have no 
disproportionate ownership structure.  
In addition, in ECEs with disproportionate ownership structure, we find VC does not 
have significant effect on the relationship between accounting performance (ROA and ROS) 
and CEO compensation given that the high accounting performances are associated with 
higher CEO compensation in both VC-backed and Non-VC-backed ECEs with 
disproportionate ownership. While the positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
Q is stronger in VC-backed sample than their Non-VC-backed counterparts, indicating that 
the positive relationship between Q and CEO compensation is strengthened rather than 
weakened in ECEs with disproportionate ownership. We also do not find any evidence that 
the VC weakened the positive relationship between CEO compensation and share return. 
Overall, the results in panel B indicate that the presence of VC weakens the positive pay-
performance relationship in ECEs without disproportionate ownership only, which is 
consistent with our H1 that the VC monitoring only exist in ECEs without disproportionate 
ownership structure.  
<Table 3 > 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship of Chinese entrepreneurial firms 
Our empirical analysis begins by examining whether VC plays a monitoring role by 
weakening the pay-performance relationship of Chinese ECEs, using Heckman two-step 
regression models (Table 4).  
In the first step of our two-stage regression, we analyze the probability of VC backing 
using a probit regression model where the explanatory variables include firm and CEO 
characteristics and governance, as well as other control and instrumental variables. In the 
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second stage we conduct new regressions by including the predicted VC (VC^) from the first-
stage regression in the baseline regression models. 
As expected, not only do both location and listing time have a positive relationship 
with VC, but, consistent with Baker and Gompers (1999), the coefficient of location is also 
statistically significant. In addition, our results further show that the interactive terms of 
predicted VC (VC^) and lagged value of performance have a consistently negative 
relationship with CEO compensation, while the coefficients of the interactive terms of VC^ 
and market-based performance are statistically significant. By combining these results with 
the findings that the coefficients of the market-based performance variables are consistently 
and significantly positive, it is reasonable to conclude that VC and market-based performance 
have a significant substitutionary effect on CEO compensation. The negative pay-
performance relationship in VC-backed entrepreneurial-controlled firms is also consistent 
with that found by Engel et al. (2002).  
In terms of the other explanatory variables, most of our control variables have a 
statistically significant relationship with CEO compensation. For example, firm size has a 
positive relationship with CEO compensation, showing coefficients that are both statistically 
and economically significant. This positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation is also consistent with earlier findings (Brunello et al., 2001). Leverage is 
statistically negatively associated with CEO compensation, which is consistent with Basu et 
al.’s (2007) findings that leverage has a statistically negative effect on CEO compensation, 
and indicates that firms with higher leverage pay their CEOs less.   
Our results are consistent with Brunello et al. (2001), in that they also show that age is 
significantly positively related to CEO compensation, probably because older CEOs have 
more experience than younger ones. A negative relationship is found between foreign 
ownership (CEO ownership) and CEO compensation, which is consistent with Core et al. 
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(1999).  However, unlike Core et al. (1999), who identifies a positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and board size and composition, our results show that board size and 
composition are negatively related to CEO compensation in China. 
Overall, our results in Table 4 are consistent with our H1 and our univariate test 
results in panel B of Table 3, indicating that VC weakens the positive relationship between 
CEO compensation between market performance of ECEs.  
<Table 4> 
4.2 The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in firms with different agency 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders 
Our study has confirmed that venture capitalists weaken the positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and market performance of Chinese ECEs. However we still 
don’t know whether the monitoring role of VC is impaired by the agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders embedded in disproportional ownership structure or not. 
In order to provide evidence to this expectation, we further examine the effect of VC on pay-
performance relationship of ECEs with and without disproportionate ownership structures.  In 
order to do so, we further separate our ECE sample into two sub-samples
11
 based on whether 
the firm has disproportionate ownership or not. We then use Equation (1) to conduct 
regressions using each of the two sub-samples, and report the results in Table 5. As the table 
shows, in ECEs without a disproportionate ownership structure, firm-performance measures 
(ROA, Q, and SR) have a statistically significant relationship with CEO compensation. 
Moreover, the interactive terms of predicted value of VC and performance have a 
consistently negative relationship with CEO compensation, with two of the coefficients (Q 
and SR) being statistically significant at a 5% or 10% level (p values = 0.03 and 0.08, 
respectively). These results suggest that the existence of VC weakens the positive 
                                                          
11 The two sub-samples are entrepreneur-controlled firms with and without a disproportionate ownership structure.  
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relationship between CEO pay and market performance in ECEs without disproportionate 
ownership structure.  
For ECEs with a disproportionate ownership, the predicted value of VC, measures of 
firm performance and their interaction terms are all statistically insignificantly related to CEO 
compensation. These results suggest that VC does not have any monitoring role in weakening 
the positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in ECEs with a 
disproportionate ownership structure, which supports our hypothesis H1. Combined with our 
results in panel C of Table 2 that the actual ownership of VC is higher in ECEs with 
disproportionate ownership structure, our results indicate that VCs in ECEs with 
disproportionate ownership do not play any monitoring role even though their actual 
ownership is higher, while they only play an active monitoring role in firms without 
disproportionate ownership even though their ownership is lower. Thus we conjecture that 
the difference in the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship reflects the conflict of 
interest between controlling and minority shareholders rather than the difference in the actual 
ownership of VC. 
<Table 5> 
4.3 Does the difference in the effect of VC on pay-performance relationship reflect the 
difference in the actual ownership, rather than the conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders? 
            We have provided evidence using VC dummy that the VC plays an active monitoring 
role in Chinese ECEs without disproportionate ownership structure, but not in firms with 
disproportionate structure. In order to provide direct evidence to support our argument that 
the difference in the effect of VC on pay-performance relationship reflects the conflict 
between controlling and minatory shareholders, rather than the difference in the actual 
ownership of VC, We conduct the following two tests. 
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First, Engel et al. (2002) indicate that VCs in the US do play a monitoring role when 
they hold a larger ownership of the firm (more than 20%).  Thus we first attempt to provide 
evidence that whether VCs play a monitoring role in ECEs with disproportionate ownership 
structure when they hold larger VC ownership. Following Engel et al. (2002), we define a 
new dummy variable, significant VC influence (SIGVC), to reflect higher VC ownership. 
SIGVC equals 1 if venture capitalists' ownership is 20% or above, and 0 otherwise, which is 
the same with Engel et al. (2002). We repeat our regressions using the new variable SIGVC 
to replace the previous VC dummy to examine whether VCs play a more active monitoring 
role when they have greater VC ownership in ECEs (Table 6).  
            Similar to the results in Table 5, we find that predicted significant VC (SIGVC^) 
plays monitoring role in weakening the positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
market performance in ECEs without disproportionate ownership structure. However, in 
ECEs with disproportionate ownership structure, the interaction terms of SIGVC^ and 
performance measures are consistently negative but none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant, which indicates that venture capitalists in ECEs with disproportionate ownership 
structure play no monitoring role even when they hold greater (more than 20%) ownership of 
the firm. 
<Table 6> 
In addition, we further examined the effect of VC ownership on the pay-performance 
relationship using a sample of VC-backed ECEs to address the concern that any difference in 
the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship reflects the difference in the actual 
ownership of VC rather than the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. The 
results are reported below in Table 7. For ECEs without a disproportionate ownership 
structure, the significantly negative pay-performance relationship in these firms confirms the 
monitoring role played by VCs in these firms, which is consistent with the results in Table 5. 
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No significant results were found between VC ownership, the interaction of VC ownership 
and firm performance and CEO compensation, suggesting that VCs with high actual 
ownership do not have stronger incentive towards monitoring, probably because the variation 
of VC ownership is not high. 
For firms with disproportionate ownership, we find that VC ownership does not have 
a significant influence on both CEO compensation and the pay-performance relationship, 
which is consistent with our results in Tables 5 and 6 above, where  VCs in these firms do not 
monitor even though  the actual ownership of VCs are  high.  
Overall, our results in Tables 6 and 7 confirm our results in Table 5 and provide 
additional evidence that the difference in the effect of VC on the pay-performance 
relationship in in ECEs with and without a disproportionate ownership structure reflects the 
difference in agency problems in the two types of firms rather than the difference in VC 
ownership.”  
<Table 7> 
 
4.4 The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in firms with different needs for 
monitoring 
We have provided evidence that the strength of VC monitoring in China is weakened 
by agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, but it is 
still not clear whether VC monitoring is also influenced by managerial conflict, which is 
expected to have an impact on a firm's need for monitoring.  
 To provide evidence for our hypothesis H2, we then divide our sample of ECEs into 
three groups of sub-samples according to a firm’s owner-manager agency costs and 
managerial discretion: firms with high (low) growth opportunity; and firms with high (low) 
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capital expenditure; and firms without (with) a family CEO. We then use Equation (1) to 
conduct new regressions on each sub-sample. The results are reported in Tables 8
12
. 
Table 8 illustrates the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in firms with 
high and low growth opportunity. As expected, VC weakens the positive pay-performance 
relationship in firms with high growth opportunity rather than in firms with low growth 
opportunity, indicating that VC tends to increase monitoring when the managerial agency 
problem is high. Similar results are found in firms with high capital expenditure (results not 
reported). Therefore, our results suggest that although VCs’ monitoring role is impaired in 
China, they still have an incentive to monitor when firms have greater managerial agency 
problems – that is, firms with high growth and high capital expenditure, which is consistent 
to our hypothesis H2. 
<Table 8> 
4.5 The effect of VC on pay performance sensitivity 
            Our study has provided substantial evidence that venture capitalists' monitoring role is 
hampered in the Chinese market, especially in ECEs with a disproportionate ownership 
structure. However, it is still hard to draw the inference that the change in executive 
compensation with regard to change in performance is caused by VC monitoring. Therefore, 
we further examine the effect of VC on delta of the CEO compensation packages. Following 
previous studies by Hartzell and Starks (2003), we construct the variable DELTA using the 
change of CEO compensation divided by the change in share return. The results are reported 
in Table 9. 
            Consistent with the results in Tables 5, the results in Table 9  show that although VC 
has a significantly negative effect on delta of CEO compensation in ECEs with 
disproportionate ownership structure, the regression coefficients become statistically 
                                                          
12 To save space, we only report the results of the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship of firms with and without 
high growth opportunity. The results of other tests are quite similar with the reported results. 
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insignificant in firms with severe agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders; that is, in ECEs with a disproportionate ownership structure. 
<Table 9> 
4.6 Why venture capitalists invest in firms with severe agency conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders? 
            Our study has shown that VCs do not play monitoring role in firms with severe 
controlling-minority shareholder agency conflict. At the same time we show that our results 
are not caused by VC only has little investment in firms with severe controlling-minority 
shareholders agency conflicts because the probability that firms with great controlling-
minority conflict are backed by VC is quite similar to firms without such conflict (Table 2, 
panels A and B). The question is: why do venture capitalists invest in those firms, given that 
their interests are much more likely to be exploited by controlling shareholders? Thus it is 
reasonable to argue that VCs may be award of additional benefit if they invest in firms with 
severe controlling-minority shareholder conflicts. In this subsection, we try to figure out what 
such benefit might be by examining whether venture capitalists invest in those firms with 
lower cost and shorter investment duration before the IPO process.  To do so, we define two 
new variables: VCCOST, which is the VC investment price to the book value per share when 
the investment is made, and VCDURATION, which is the number of years from VC 
investment year to IPO. If a firm has more than one VC investment, we calculate the 
weighted averages VCCOST and VCDURATION. The lower the VCCOST and the shorter 
the VCDURATION, the more benefit venture capitalists have from the investment.  
            Then we conduct regressions to regress VCCOST and VCDURATION on both SOE 
dummy and disproportionate ownership dummy (DIS) using a cross sectional sample of VC-
backed firms. The results are reported in Table 10.  The results in Table 10 confirm our 
expectation that VC investment in firms with great controlling-minority agency conflicts with 
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lower cost and shorter duration because DIS dummy is negatively related to our dependent 
variables and the coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore, we provide evidence that 
VCs do have additional benefit when investing in firm with great controlling-minority agency 
conflicts. 
<Table 10> 
4.7 Further tests        
To provide additional robustness  to our main findings, we further conduct a series of 
regressions, which includes: (1) a regression that examines the relative importance of the two 
types of agency conflicts in explaining VC monitoring; (2) the effect of state-owned or non-
state-owned VC on the pay-performance relationship; (3) the effect of VC on the pay-
performance relationship using expected CEO compensation and expected accounting 
performance; (4) the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship before and after 2006; 
and (5) the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship using industry adjusted 
performance. However, not all results are reported due to space limitations. 
4.7.1 The relative importance of two types of agency conflict in explaining VC monitoring 
            This paper has provided evidence that  venture capitalists' monitoring role is impaired 
by the second type of agency problem (conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders), and that venture capitalists tend to play an active monitoring role when the 
first type of agency problem (managerial agency problem) is severe and no agency problem 
of the second type exists. However, it is still unclear which type of agency problem 
dominates.  To answer this question, we further divide our ECEs sample with high growth 
into two subsamples – ECEs with high growth and disproportionate ownership and ECEs 
with high growth but without disproportionate ownership – and we conduct regressions to 
examine VC monitoring in the two subsamples. The results are reported in Table 11. 
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             We find that venture capitalists play no monitoring role in the subsample of firms 
with high growth and disproportionate ownership, indicating that their monitoring role is 
impaired even in firms that have both severe managerial agency problem and the controlling-
minority shareholders agency problem, which means that venture capitalist does not 
monitoring even when firms with disproportionate ownership structure have greater need for 
monitoring. Combined with the finding that VC does play an active monitoring role in firms 
with high growth but without disproportionate ownership, our results show that the second 
type of agency problem dominates in explaining VC monitoring. 
<Table 11> 
4.7.2 State-funded vs. non-state-funded VC:  which plays a more important monitoring role? 
           As discussed above, state-funded and non-state-funded VC coexists in the Chinese 
market. For example, our sample shows that a total of 62 VC companies are involved in 76 
VC-backed IPOs, of which 22 (37%) are state-funded. Venture capitalists of state-funded VC 
in China are less likely to play an active monitoring role because they are usually established 
by local governments to help the development of local firms, the aim being to stimulate the 
local economy; thus venture capitalists of these state-funded VC tend, therefore, to care more 
about the political goal than investment return. To provide evidence for this expectation, we 
further create two dummy variables: STATEVC, which is defined as 1 if the firm is backed 
by state-funded VCs, and NONSTATEVC, which is defined as 1 if the firm is backed by at 
least one non-state-funded VC. We then conduct new regressions to see whether the two 
dummies have different effects on the pay-performance relationship. The results are reported 
in Table 12.  
             As expected, the results support our expectation that venture capitalists' monitoring 
role is found only in ECEs that are backed by non-state-funded VC
13
.  
                                                          
13 Similar results are found in ECEs without disproportionate ownership structure; the results are not reported to save space. 
32 
 
<Table 12> 
4.7.3 The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship using expected CEO 
compensation and expected accounting performance 
            Following Core (2002), who argues that expected pay and expected accounting 
performance should be controlled for when examining the pay-performance relationship, we 
further conduct regressions controlling for both expected pay and expected accounting 
performance. The results are reported in Table 13. Similar to the results in Tables 5 and 6, we 
find that VC does not have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and accounting performance when expected CEO compensation and expected 
accounting performance are controlled for.  
<Table 13> 
4.7.4 Other results 
For robustness, we also conduct regressions that examine the effect of the 
implementation of the interim measures for the administration of early-stage venture-capital 
enterprises in 2006 on our main results. We do not find any evidence that our main results 
change significantly after 2006. The results suggest that although the regulation change 
increases VC investment activity, venture capitalists' monitoring role does not change. 
Finally, we also conduct regressions using industry-adjusted performances as 
measures of firm performance, and the results are quite similar to our main results, as 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. The results for these tests are not reported to save space. 
5. Conclusions 
 This research examines VC monitoring of managerial behaviour in the Chinese 
capital market by examining its impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. We document 
that venture capitalists’ monitoring role depends on agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders caused by firms’ controlling structures. Particularly, venture capitalists' 
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monitoring is impaired in ECEs with disproportionate ownership structures, which cause 
severe agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. In addition, we show 
that venture capitalists' monitoring increases where firms have greater managerial agency 
problems, which means greater need for monitoring. Our findings further show that venture 
capitalists invest in firms with great controlling-minority shareholder conflict because their 
investment risk that they may be exploited by controlling shareholders is compensated for in 
terms of lower investment cost and shorter investment duration to IPO. We also provide 
additional evidence that the second type of agency issue (controlling-minority agency 
conflict) has a greater impact on VC monitoring than the first type of agency issue 
(managerial agency problem), and that non-state-funded VC have much more incentive to 
monitor than those state-funded VC. 
Previous literature has documented that VC in the US works to mitigate the 
managerial agency problem by playing an active monitoring role (Engel et al., 2002); our 
findings complement this literature by showing that the effectiveness of Venture capitalist’s 
monitoring is dominated and impaired by the second type of agency problem which is the 
agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Our results indicate that 
although  venture capitalists in China identify and monitor their invested firms more closely 
when the firms have greater managerial agency issues, such monitoring disappears if the 
firms also have great controlling-minority agency conflict. Overall, our study suggests that 
the monitoring role of VC is impaired in an emerging market, where firms have a much more 
complex ownership structure than that in the US market, and where the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders dominates.  
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Table 1. Detailed definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables  
Managerial compensation (LNPAY) Log of the top three executives’ compensation 
Delta of executive 
compensation(DELTA) 
The change in CEO compensation with respect to the change in share 
return. 
Main independent variables  
VC-backed firms (VC) Dummy equals 1 if a firm received VC investment in its pre-IPO 
period. 
Significant VC influence (SIGVC) Dummy equals 1 if more than 20% of the firm’s ownership is owned by 
VC. 
State-funded VC (STATEVC) Dummy equals 1 if the VC funded by the state or a state-owned entity. 
VC ownership (VCOWNERSHIP) Percentage of shares held by VC investor. 
Firm performance  
Return on assets (ROA) Net income/total assets  
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/sales 
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value/replacement value 
Share return (SR) Yearly share return of each firm 
Categorical variables  
Disproportionate ownership (DIS) If the control rights of the ultimate owner exceed the cash flow rights, 
we define the firm as DIS; otherwise, we define the firm as a NON-DIS. 
High growth opportunity 
(HGROWTH) 
If the sales growth of a firm is higher than the median, we define the 
firm as HGROWTH; otherwise, we define it as without HGROWTH. 
Firm and CEO characteristics  
Firm size (SIZE) Log of total assets 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) Total directors on the board  
Board composition (BOARDCOMP) Independent directors/total directors  
Leverage (LEV) Total debts/total assets in book value 
CEO-chair duality (DUALITY) Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
CEO age (AGE) Average age of managers and board directors 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors 
CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) Ownership proportion held by the CEO 
Instrumental variables 
Firm location (LOCATION) Equal to 1 if the firm is located in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, or Shandong 
Firm listing time (LISTTIME) Equal to 1 if the firm went public after March 2006 
Other variables  
Industry (INDUSTRY)
 
 Equal to 1 for the specific industry 
Year (YEAR) Equal to 1 for the specific year 
39 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A. Distribution of VC-backed firms 
This panel presents the distribution of VC-backed firms with disproportionate ownership (DIS) and 
without disproportionate ownership.  
 
No. of firms VC-backed firms Percentage (%) 
ECEs 203 54 26.60  
     -ECEs with DIS 113 30 26.55  
     -ECEs without DIS 90 24 26.67  
 
Panel B. Distribution of VC dummy, based on firm-year observations 
 
No. of observations No. of VC dummies Percentage (%) 
ECEs 522 133 25.48 
      -ECEs with DIS 308 74 24.03 
      -ECEs without DIS 214 59 27.57 
 
Panel C. Distribution of VC ownership: Sample of VC-backed observations 
 
No. of observations VC ownership (%) 
VC-backed ECEs 133 13.36 
      -ECEs with DIS 62 15.69 
      -ECEs without DIS 71 10.56 
 
Panel D. Distribution of STATEVC, based on firm-year observations 
 
No. of observations No. of STATEVC Percentage (%) 
Observations include SOEs and ECEs 700 50 7.14 
ECEs 522 37 7.09 
      -ECEs with DIS 308 22 7.14 
      -ECEs without DIS 214 15 7.01 
 
 
Panel E. Descriptive analysis of variables based on firm-year observations: full sample 
This panel presents the summary statistics of our regression variables based on firm-year 
observations.  
Var.  Mean Median Min Max St. dev. 
PAY(1000 RMB) 896.66  687.80  36.00  5100.00  698.77 
ROA 0.06  0.06  -0.29 0.37  0.05  
ROS 0.10  0.08  -1.24  0.54  0.12  
Q 1.66  1.41  0.89  10.30 0.98  
SR 0.72  0.73  -1.91  11.94  1.24  
SIZE (Million RMB) 1540.00  935.00  220  36000  2460.00  
BOARDSIZE 7.47  6  5.00  11.00  1.28  
BOARDCOMP 0.37  0.33  0.00  0.80  0.06  
LEV 0.39  0.41  0.02  0.85  0.17 
DUALITY 0.22  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.42  
AGE 45.06  45.00  36.00  55.00  3.14  
FOREIGN 0.10  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.30  
CEOSHARE 0.22  0.17 0.00  0.78  0.22 
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Table 3. Univariate test results of VC and non-VC backed firms 
This table reports various univariate test results for CEO pay of VC-backed and non-VC-backed 
firms. Definitions of all the variables are given in Table 1. We control for firm performance and 
firms’ category when conducting the univariate tests in panels A, B, and C. In those panels, the VC 
columns represent the mean of CEO pay of VC-backed firms, and the non-VC columns represent the 
mean of CEO pay of non-VC-backed firms. The ‘Difference’ rows (columns) report the difference of 
CEO pay in different types of firms and the ‘T-test’ rows (columns) report the T-value of the 
difference test of CEO pay in different types of firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Univariate test for CEO pay and performance of VC-backed and non-VC backed firms 
  VC NON-VC Difference T-test 
Pay (RMB) 1,048,784  846,208  202,576  2.88***  
ROA 0.0718  0.0567  0.0151  2.96***  
ROS 0.1316  0.0847  0.0469  2.47***  
Q 1.7487  1.5691  0.1796  2.27***  
SR 0.7417 0.6813 0.0604 0.57 
 
Panel B. Univariate test for CEO pay of VC-backed and non VC-backed firms with and without 
disproportionate ownership: entrepreneur-controlled firms 
    ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
  
NON-VC VC NON-VC VC 
ROA 
Low 588105.80  745217.30  718154.80  887417.50  
High 1258066.00  1203803.00  908596.10  1266513.00  
Difference -669960.20  -458585.70  -190441.30  -379095.50  
T-value -5.63***  -2.80***  -2.41**  -2.26**  
ROS 
Low 750293.20  979628.70  739837.80  952568.00  
High 1091610.00  984515.40  891714.60  1188482.00  
Difference -341316.80  -4886.70  -151876.80  -235914.00  
T-value -2.67***  -0.03  -1.91*  -1.83*  
Q 
Low 827959.10  971061.20  747648.10  1000102.00  
High 1016872.00  991229.00  880006.80  1168957.00  
Difference -188912.90  -20167.80  -132358.70  -168855.00  
T-value -1.75*  -0.12  -1.60  -1.96**  
SR 
Low 906107.70  896830.10  779083.00  1087123.00  
High 931695.20  1047401.00  836209.60  1119459.00  
Difference -25587.50  -150570.90  -57126.60  -32336.00  
T-value -0.20  -0.86  -0.72  -0.19  
 
41 
 
Table 4. The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship of entrepreneurial controlled 
firms 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship of Chinese 
ECEs. The Heckman two-step regression model is used to control the endogeneity of VC backing. The first-
stage regression uses a probit regression, in which the dependent variable is a VC dummy and the instrumental 
variables are firm location and listing time. The second-stage regression uses CEO compensation as the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variable in the second-stage regression includes the predicted VC dummy 
from the first stage, performance measures, their interactive terms, and other controls. P-values are displayed in 
italics; standard errors are clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.   
 First step Second step 
Var. VC LNPAY 
      VC^ 
 
0.85  0.86  1.88**  1.10  
  
0.30  0.26  0.05  0.12  
ROA T-1  
3.90**  
   
  
0.05  
   ROS T-1  
 
1.14  
  
  
 
0.19  
  Q T-1  
  
0.16*  
 
  
  
0.06  
 SRT-1  
   
0.07**  
  
   
0.03  
VC^*ROA T-1 -3.82  
  
  
0.62  
   VC^*ROS T-1  
 
-2.75  
  
  
 
0.44  
  VC^*Q T-1  
  
-0.91**  
 
  
  
0.04  
 VC^*SR T-1  
   
-0.72***  
     
0.01  
LOCATE 1.59**  
    
 
0.05  
    LISTTIME 0.31  
    
 
0.55  
    SIZE -0.42  0.31***  0.36***  0.35***  0.38***  
 0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE 0.44***  -0.08  -0.08*  -0.07  -0.09*  
 0.01  0.11  0.10  0.16  0.10  
BOARDCOMP 1.71  -0.34  -0.31  -0.16  -0.25  
 0.14  0.11  0.16  0.48  0.23  
LEV 1.33  -0.57**  -0.94***  -1.20***  -1.09***  
 0.26  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  
DUALITY 0.33  0.21**  0.21**  0.23**  0.19**  
 0.36  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.04  
AGE -0.01  0.03**  0.02**  0.02*  0.02  
 0.89  0.02  0.05  0.10  0.11  
FOREIGN 0.55  -0.07  -0.05  -0.01  -0.04  
 0.27  0.65  0.74  0.96  0.77  
CEOSHARE 0.53  -0.18  -0.13  -0.11  -0.10  
 
0.69  0.33  0.49  0.54  0.58  
_cons 2.00  6.54***  5.99***  6.06***  5.79***  
 
0.72  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 522  522  522  522  522  
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.05  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.14  
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Table 5. The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship: entrepreneur-controlled firms 
with and without disproportionate ownership 
This table examines how VC affects the pay-performance relationship in Chinese ECEs by separating the 
sample into two types of firms (ECEs with disproportionate ownership and ECEs without disproportionate 
ownership). The dependent variable is CEO pay, and independent variables include the predicted value of the 
VC dummy, performance, their interactive terms, and other controls. The performance measures include ROA, 
ROS, Q, and SR. P-values are displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
VC^ 1.39  0.99  2.58  0.77  0.65  0.65  1.22  0.75  
 0.39  0.47  0.14  0.54  0.49  0.47  0.27  0.36  
ROA T-1 7.16**  
   
0.34  
   
 0.05  
   
0.88  
   ROS T-1 
 
2.17  
   
-0.71  
  
 
 
0.16  
   
0.52  
  Q T-1 
  
0.22**  
   
0.09  
 
 
  
0.03  
   
0.51  
 SRT-1 
   
0.11**  
   
0.06  
 
   
0.05  
   
0.37  
VC^*ROA T-1 -18.37  
   
8.57  
   
 0.24  
   
0.34  
   VC^*ROS T-1 -7.77  
   
4.67  
  
 
 
0.24  
   
0.30  
  VC^*Q T-1 
  
-1.85**  
   
-0.13  
 
 
  
0.03  
   
0.80  
 VC^*SR T-1 
   
-1.02*  
   
0.29  
    
0.08  
   
0.34  
SIZE 0.39***  0.42***  0.42***  0.46***  0.32***  0.35***  0.35***  0.34***  
 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.11  -0.13*  -0.02  -0.01  -0.00  0.01  
 
0.10  0.10  0.19  0.10  0.81  0.88  0.96  0.92  
BOARDCOMP -0.44  -0.42  -0.02  -0.21  -0.32  -0.25  -0.24  -0.17  
 
0.19  0.21  0.96  0.51  0.28  0.42  0.44  0.57  
LEV -0.96*  -1.35***  -1.85***  -1.58***  -0.51  -0.80***  -0.91***  -1.04***  
 
0.09  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.01  0.00  0.00  
DUALITY 0.55***  0.58***  0.60***  0.48***  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.04  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.61  0.60  0.57  0.71  
AGE 0.01  0.00  -0.00  -0.01  0.05***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  
 
0.80  0.88  0.85  0.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
FOREIGN -0.26  -0.31  -0.32  -0.25  -0.18  -0.13  -0.13  -0.10  
 
0.47  0.39  0.36  0.44  0.24  0.40  0.42  0.51  
CEOSHARE -0.58*  -0.58*  -0.64*  -0.64**  -0.13  0.00  0.04  0.03  
 
0.10  0.10  0.07  0.05  0.69  1.00  0.90  0.92  
_cons 5.65**  5.63*  5.54**  5.60**  5.34***  4.97***  4.90***  5.09***  
 
0.05  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 214  214  214  214  308  308  308  308 
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.15  0.20  0.27  0.20  0.17  0.17  0.19  
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Table 6. The effect of significant VC on the pay-performance relationship: entrepreneur-
controlled firms with and without disproportionate ownership 
This table examines how significant VC ownership influences the pay-performance relationship in Chinese 
ECEs by separating the sample into two types of firms (one with disproportionate ownership and one without 
disproportionate ownership). The dependent variable is CEO pay, and independent variables include the 
predicted value of SIGVC dummy, performance, their interactive terms, and other controls. The performance 
measures include ROA, ROS, Q, and SR. P-values are displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
SIGVC^ 0.68  0.62  0.77**  0.20  0.47**  0.44**  0.44*  0.53***  
 
0.19  0.14  0.04  0.37  0.04  0.04  0.09  0.00  
ROA T-1 2.99**  
   
2.15***  
   
 
0.05  
   
0.01  
   ROS T-1 
 
0.39  
   
0.32  
  
  
0.55  
   
0.35  
  Q T-1 
  
0.13*  
   
0.06  
 
   
0.07  
   
0.25  
 SRT-1 
   
0.30***  
   
0.17***  
    
0.00  
   
0.00  
SIGVC^* ROA T-1 8.30  
   
-1.03  
   
 
0.25  
   
0.67  
   SIGVC^* ROS T-1 5.86  
   
-0.23  
  
  
0.16  
   
0.88  
  SIGVC^* Q T-1 
 
-0.37***  
   
-0.01  
 
   
0.01  
   
0.92  
 SIGVC^* SR T-1 
  
-0.45***  
   
-0.16  
    
0.00  
   
0.12  
SIZE 0.44***  0.51***  0.52***  0.44***  0.29***  0.32***  0.32***  0.31***  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE -0.15**  -0.16***  -0.15**  -0.10  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  
 
0.02  0.01  0.02  0.11  0.46  0.45  0.37  0.55  
BOARDCOMP -0.45  -0.46  -0.25  0.08  -0.25  -0.21  -0.19  -0.19  
 
0.13  0.13  0.38  0.78  0.37  0.46  0.51  0.49  
LEV -0.85  -1.38***  -1.86***  -1.52***  -0.71**  -0.98***  -0.99***  -1.15***  
 
0.13  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  
DUALITY 0.48***  0.50***  0.55***  0.50***  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  0.77  0.81  0.89  
AGE 0.01  0.00  -0.00  -0.01  0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  
 
0.78  0.98  0.94  0.72  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
FOREIGN -0.26  -0.36  -0.38  -0.25  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11  -0.10  
 
0.40  0.26  0.21  0.38  0.29  0.40  0.38  0.41  
CEOSHARE -0.54*  -0.59*  -0.70**  -0.56*  -0.04  0.04  0.09  0.10  
 
0.09  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.90  0.91  0.76  0.75  
_cons 5.13*  4.38  4.46*  5.45**  5.60***  5.14***  5.15***  5.57***  
 
0.06  0.11  0.09  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 214  214  214  214  308  308  308  308  
Adjusted R2 0.17  0.15  0.21  0.29  0.22  0.20  0.20  0.23  
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Table 7. The effect of VC ownership on the pay-performance relationship: entrepreneur-
controlled firms with and without disproportionate ownership 
This table examines the effect of direct VC ownership on the pay-performance relationship of Chinese ECEs. 
The sample includes only VC-backed observations. The dependent variable is CEO pay, and key independent 
variables are VC ownership, firm performance and their interaction term. The performance measures include 
ROA, ROS, Q, and SR. P-values are displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
VCOWNERSHIP -2.00  0.15  -2.08  0.19  -1.71  -1.24  2.50  -0.08  
 
0.64  0.97  0.51  0.91  0.39  0.61  0.33  0.94  
ROA T-1 0.97  
   
-2.09  
   
 0.90  
   
0.44  
   ROS T-1 
 
-1.28  
   
-1.37  
  
 
 
0.76  
   
0.53  
  Q T-1 
  
-0.58***  
   
0.38  
 
 
  
0.00  
   
0.13  
 SRT-1 
   
-0.34*  
   
0.08  
    
0.06  
   
0.57  
VCOWNERSHIP* ROA T-1 43.16  
   
18.16  
   
 
0.45  
   
0.41  
   VCOWNERSHIP* ROS T-1 
 
3.25  
   
7.23  
  
  
0.94  
   
0.65  
  VCOWNERSHIP* Q T-1 
  
1.49  
   
-1.89  
 
   
0.41  
   
0.22  
 VCOWNERSHIP* SRT-1 
   
-0.36  
   
-0.44  
    
0.77  
   
0.62  
SIZE -0.17  -0.11  0.11  -0.18  0.63***  0.63***  0.61***  0.61***  
 
0.59  0.74  0.68  0.51  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE -0.04  0.02  0.07  0.06  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  
 
0.75  0.86  0.47  0.59  0.89  0.85  0.86  0.84  
BOARDCOMP 0.19  0.40  0.38  0.82  -0.06  -0.05  -0.10  -0.13  
 
0.72  0.52  0.40  0.12  0.91  0.93  0.86  0.82  
LEV -1.59  -2.49*  -2.22**  -1.93*  -2.23***  -2.35***  -2.19***  -2.21***  
 
0.23  0.08  0.03  0.07  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
DUALITY 0.20  0.38  0.22  0.39  0.32  0.32  0.35*  0.34*  
 
0.57  0.26  0.42  0.18  0.11  0.12  0.07  0.08  
AGE 0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02  
 
0.95  0.92  0.99  0.91  0.63  0.69  0.44  0.59  
FOREIGN 0.17  0.02  0.06  0.06  -0.35  -0.34  -0.35  -0.33  
 
0.84  0.98  0.93  0.94  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.17  
CEOSHARE -0.16  0.13  -0.32  -0.36  0.83  0.92  0.93  0.99  
 
0.88  0.91  0.72  0.71  0.39  0.33  0.31  0.28  
_cons 15.87***  14.71**  10.94**  15.91***  1.62  1.78  0.93  1.84  
 
0.01  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.73  0.71  0.84  0.70  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 62  62  62  62  71  71  71  71  
Adjusted R2 0.07  0.04  0.34  0.24  0.27  0.27  0.30  0.27  
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Table 8. The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship: entrepreneur-controlled firms 
with low and high growth opportunity 
This table examines how VC affects the pay-performance relationship in Chinese entrepreneurial firms by 
separating the sample into two types of firms (one with high growth rate and one with low growth rate). The 
dependent variable is CEO pay, and independent variables include predicted VC, performance, their interactive 
terms, and other controls. The performance measures include ROA, ROS, Q, and SR. P-values are displayed in 
italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs with HGROWTH ECEs without HGROWTH 
VC^ 0.79  0.20  2.49  0.76  0.83  1.52  0.45  1.00  
 0.51  0.86  0.04  0.42  0.48  0.17  0.79  0.37  
ROA T-1 5.21*  
   
1.52  
   
 0.06  
   
0.62  
   ROS T-1 
 
1.02  
   
1.23  
  
 
 
0.49  
   
0.31  
  Q T-1 
  
0.41***  
   
-0.28  
 
 
  
0.00  
   
0.19  
 SRT-1 
   
0.14*  
   
-0.17  
 
   
0.07  
   
0.19  
VC^*ROA T-1 -10.64  
   
9.03  
   
 0.32  
   
0.46  
   VC^*ROS T-1 
 
-1.61  
   
-3.34  
  
 
 
0.77  
   
0.52  
  VC^*Q T-1 
  
-1.66***  
   
0.25  
 
 
  
0.00  
   
0.79  
 VC^*SR T-1 
   
-1.04***  
   
0.03  
    
0.01  
   
0.95  
SIZE 0.37***  0.41***  0.34***  0.41***  0.23**  0.29***  0.29***  0.30***  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE -0.08  -0.09  -0.07  -0.08  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  
 
0.22  0.18  0.35  0.24  0.46  0.50  0.64  0.63  
BOARDCOMP -0.48*  -0.47*  -0.23  -0.32  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.19  
 
0.07  0.08  0.39  0.23  0.70  0.74  0.73  0.63  
LEV -0.88**  -1.14***  -1.32***  -1.31***  -0.20  -0.75*  -1.13***  -0.90**  
 
0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.64  0.07  0.00  0.02  
DUALITY 0.39***  0.37***  0.40***  0.33***  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.08  
 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.75  0.59  0.43  0.59  
AGE 0.03*  0.03*  0.03*  0.02  0.03*  0.02  0.02  0.02  
 
0.10  0.08  0.10  0.17  0.10  0.25  0.26  0.31  
FOREIGN 0.09  0.08  0.18  0.04  -0.20  -0.13  -0.08  -0.07  
 
0.68  0.70  0.41  0.86  0.36  0.55  0.72  0.75  
CEOSHARE -0.04  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.42  -0.26  -0.15  -0.22  
 
0.88  0.81  0.83  0.88  0.15  0.38  0.59  0.45  
_cons 4.84***  4.17**  5.06***  4.44**  7.15***  6.60***  7.05***  6.44***  
 
0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 261  261  261  261  261  261  261  261  
Adjusted R2 0.18  0.16  0.19  0.18  0.09  0.06  0.09  0.09  
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 Table 9. The effect of VC on delta of CEO compensation 
This table reports the results on the effect of VC on delta of CEO compensation in different types of firms. The 
dependent variable is DELTA, which is the change in CEO compensation divided by the change in share return. 
P-values are displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var.    
 
ECEs ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
VC^ -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.37 
 
0.00 0.01 0.12 
ΔSIZE (In Million) 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
 
0.21 0.00 0.15 
ΔBOARDSIZE 0.10** 0.13*** 0.09 
 
0.02 0.01 0.15 
ΔBOARDCOMP -0.20 -0.27 -0.08 
 
0.41 0.24 0.84 
ΔLEV 0.72 0.18 1.09 
 
0.14 0.70 0.15 
ΔDUALITY -0.07 0.13 -0.15 
 
0.56 0.26 0.41 
ΔAGE 0.02 0.00 0.05 
 
0.35 0.94 0.20 
ΔFOREIGN -0.13 -0.61* 0.00 
 
0.80 0.07 -0.82 
ΔCEOSHARE 0.05 -0.17 1.79 
 
0.91 0.60 0.28 
_cons 0.06 -0.01 0.04 
 
0.23 0.83 0.58 
year Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 522 214 308 
Adj R-squared 0.06 0.17 0.09 
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Table 10. VC investment cost and VC duration in SOEs and firms with disproportionate 
ownership: A cross-section sample of VC-backed ECEs only 
This table presents the effect of SOE and DISPROPORTIONATE on VC investment cost and duration before 
IPO. VCCOST is the VC investment P/BV ratio when the investment is made; VCDURATION is the number of 
years between the investment year and the IPO year. SOE and DIS are dummy variables that represent SOEs 
and firms with a disproportionate ownership structure. Industry and investment year are controlled for. The 
sample is smaller because only VC-backed firms are included, and each firm only has one observation because 
the sample is cross-sectional. P-values are displayed in italics; *, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Var. VCCOST VCDURATION 
   DIS -0.43*  -1.19***  
 
0.08  0.01  
_cons 2.24***  2.92*  
 
0.01  0.07  
year Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes 
Obs. 54  54  
Adjusted R2 0.09  0.22  
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Table 11. The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship: ECEs with high growth and 
disproportionate ownership and ECEs with high growth but without disproportionate 
ownership 
This table examines how VC affects the pay-performance relationship in Chinese ECEs by separating the 
sample into two types of firms (one with HGROWTH and DIS; the other with HGROWTH but without DIS). 
The dependent variable is CEO pay, and independent variables include predicted VC, performance, their 
interactive terms, and other controls. The performance measures include ROA, ROS, Q, and SR. P-values are 
displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs with HGROWTH and without DIS ECEs with HGROWTH and DIS  
VC^ 2.35  -0.14  3.52*  0.35  1.52  1.50  2.45  1.58  
 
0.33  0.95  0.09  0.84  0.28  0.27  0.13  0.19  
ROA T-1 12.29**  
   
-0.80  
   
 
0.04  
   
0.78  
   ROS T-1 
 
3.18  
   
-1.54  
  
 
 
0.33  
   
0.34  
  Q T-1 
  
0.78***  
   
0.01  
 
 
  
0.00  
   
0.97  
 SRT-1 
   
0.20*  
   
0.00  
 
   
0.08  
   
0.95  
VC^*ROA T-1 -45.80**  
   
13.87  
   
 
0.04  
   
0.23  
   VC^*ROS T-1 -11.05  
  
 
8.65  
  
 
 
0.36  
   
0.14  
  VC^*Q T-1 
 
-3.39***  
 
 
 
-0.10  
 
 
  
0.00  
   
0.87  
 VC^*SR T-1 
  
-2.00***  
 
  
0.74  
    
0.02  
   
0.12  
SIZE 0.37**  0.37**  0.28  0.43**  0.41***  0.43***  0.46***  0.41***  
 
0.05  0.06  0.13  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
BOARDSIZE -0.11  -0.11  -0.03  -0.12  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  0.01  
 
0.32  0.34  0.79  0.27  0.61  0.76  0.79  0.96  
BOARDCOMP -0.46  -0.46  0.15  -0.18  -0.27  -0.06  -0.06  0.14  
 
0.22  0.23  0.72  0.62  0.58  0.90  0.91  0.78  
LEV -1.55**  -1.53**  -1.44**  -1.51***  -0.17  -0.42  -0.85*  -0.71*  
 
0.05  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.73  0.41  0.08  0.10  
DUALITY 0.69***  0.64***  0.74***  0.53***  -0.04  -0.09  -0.10  -0.05  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.81  0.61  0.56  0.76  
AGE 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.04**  0.04**  0.04**  0.04**  
 
0.68  0.59  0.80  0.99  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  
FOREIGN 0.00  0.09  0.32  -0.14  -0.34  -0.33  -0.28  -0.26  
 
1.00  0.84  0.44  0.74  0.16  0.18  0.26  0.28  
CEOSHARE -0.23  -0.24  -0.02  -0.40  -0.09  0.04  0.03  0.04  
 
0.61  0.60  0.96  0.34  0.83  0.93  0.94  0.94  
_cons 5.91  6.32  6.88*  5.80  3.78**  3.30*  3.04  3.62*  
 
0.14  0.13  0.08  0.13  0.05  0.10  0.14  0.06  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 118  118  118  118  141  141  141  141  
Adjusted R2 0.19  0.16  0.24  0.27  0.26  0.24  0.22  0.26  
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Table 12. The effect of state-funded VC and non-state-funded VC on the pay-performance 
relationship 
This table examines how state-funded VC and non-state-funded VC affect the pay-performance relationship in 
Chinese firms. The dependent variable is CEO pay, and independent variables include dummies for state-funded 
VC and non-state-funded VC, performance, their interactive terms, and other controls. The performance 
measures include ROA, ROS, Q, and SR. Control variables are included but not reported to save space. P-values 
are displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
STATEVC 0.33  0.29  0.72***  0.26  
 
0.14  0.15  0.01  0.12  
ROA T-1 2.76***  
   
 
0.00  
   ROS T-1 
 
0.42  
  
  
0.21  
  Q T-1 
  
0.03*  
 
   
0.09  
 SR T-1 
   
0.07**  
    
0.04  
ROA T-1*STATEVC -1.02  
   
 
0.74  
   ROS T-1*STATEVC 
 
-0.20  
  
  
0.91  
  Q T-1*STATEVC 
  
-0.24  
 
   
0.15  
 SR T-1*STATEVC 
   
0.03  
    
0.84  
NONSTATEVC 0.30**  0.37**  0.57***  0.38***  
 
0.05  0.02  0.01  0.00  
ROA T-1*NONSTATEVC 0.19  
   
 
0.92  
   ROS T-1*NONSTATEVC 
 
-0.28  
  
  
0.79  
  Q T-1*NONSTATEVC 
  
-0.13**  
 
   
0.02  
 SR T-1*NONSTATEVC 
   
-0.04**  
    
0.05  
_cons 6.59***  6.01***  5.78***  5.95***  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 522  522  522  522  
Adjusted R2 0.17  0.15  0.16  0.15  
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Table 13. The effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship: with control for expected pay 
and expected performance 
This table presents the results on the effect of accounting VC and accounting performance on CEO 
compensation with control for expected pay and expected accounting performance. LNPAY T-1 is the lagged 
value of LNPAY; ΔROA and ΔROS are the change of ROA and ROS compared to the previous year. Other 
variables are defined as in Table 1. Control variables are included but not reported to save space. P-values are 
displayed in italics; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level. 
Var. LNPAY 
 
ECEs without DIS ECEs with DIS 
LNPAY T-1 0.89***  0.88***  0.87***  0.97***  0.74***  0.73***  0.73***  0.68***  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
VC^ 0.23  0.16  0.03  2.26**  0.24  0.24  0.15  0.28  
 
0.79  0.85  0.97  0.04  0.68  0.68  0.79  0.71  
ΔROA 5.09  
   
2.69*  
   
 
0.12  
   
0.08  
   ΔROS 
 
1.29  
   
1.39*  
  
  
0.53  
   
0.08  
  ΔQ 
  
0.30**  
   
0.00  
 
   
0.02  
   
0.97  
 ΔSR 
   
0.05*  
   
0.01  
    
0.06  
   
0.82  
VC^*ΔROA -8.53  
   
-6.80  
   
 
0.52  
   
0.27  
   VC^*ΔROS 
 
1.42  
   
-4.82  
  
  
0.85  
   
0.10  
  VC^*ΔQ 
  
-0.63**  
   
-0.03  
 
   
0.02  
   
0.91  
 VC^*ΔSR 
   
-0.06*  
   
0.03  
    
0.06  
   
0.85  
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 214  214  214  214  308  308  308  308  
Adjusted R2 0.53  0.53  0.54  0.68  0.57  0.57  0.56  0.52  
 
